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Abstract 
Accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance. Establishing accountable 
governments is a top priority on the international development agenda. Yet, scholars and 
democracy practitioners know little about how accountability mechanisms develop and thus can 
be supported by international and national actors. The present study tackles the questions of 
how, and in what sequence accountability sub-types develop. We consider not only vertical 
(elections and political parties) and horizontal accountability (legislature, judiciary and other 
oversight bodies), but also diagonal accountability (civil society and media) in both their de-jure 
and the de-facto dimensions. By utilizing novel sequencing methods, we study their sequential 
relationships in 173 countries from 1900 to the present with data from the new V-Dem dataset. 
Considering the long-term dimensions of institution building, this study indicates that most 
aspects of de-facto vertical accountability precede other forms of accountability. Effective 
institutions of horizontal accountability – such as vigorous parliaments and independent high 
courts – evolve rather late in the sequence and build on progress in many other areas.    
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I. Introduction 
Political accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance and a key topic in 
academia and development practice. The power of the people to hold political leaders to account 
is one of the fundamental pillars of representative democracy. Therefore, accountability is central 
to the most widely used definitions of democracy (e.g. Dahl 1971, 1989; Schmitter et al. 1991). 
Moreover, establishing accountable institutions is a top priority on the international development 
agenda, and singled out as a target of the Sustainable Development Goals (UN Resolution: 
A/Res/70/1).  
Yet, scholars and practitioners know very little about how and in what sequence 
accountability sub-types evolve in practice. Arguably, solving that puzzle requires a systematic 
study of the patterns of long-term historical development across many countries. The present 
study presents such an approach by investigating the question: Are there generalizable sequences 
in the evolution of accountability? More specifically, the study focuses on whether certain types 
of accountability are preconditions for achieving high levels of others.  
Scholars from a diverse range of fields employ the concept of accountability with over 
100 subtypes and usages attached to it (Lindberg 2013: 204). Yet, the underlying etymological 
principle of allocating authority, appraising performance, and the possibility of applying 
sanctions, spans across. An established tradition in political science, at least since Locke’s (1980  
[1690]) argument, is that accountable leadership requires separation between governors and the 
governed. This paper is focusing on political accountability in this original sense: When decision-
making power is transferred from a principal (e.g. the citizens) to an agent (e.g. government), 
there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent accountable for their decisions and 
tools be available for the principal to sanction the agent. Accountability hence is associated with 
the act of discretionary governing, typically understood as the authoritative allocation of 
resources and exercising control and coordination (e.g. Dahl 1971; Kooiman 1993; Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992). This explains why accountability has always been central to democratic theory, 
even if there are naturally, types and mechanisms of accountability that have little to do with 
democracy (in accounting, business relationships, etc.).  
Based on earlier work [reference blinded for review: 2] we thus approach political 
accountability as “constraints on the governments’ use of political power through requirements 
for justification of its actions and potential sanctions.” By governments we mean the executive 
branch of the government including the chief executive: the head of state or government, the 
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cabinet, ministries and top civil servants (Coppedge et al. 2016: 413). The actors of accountability 
in this conceptualization are voters, political parties, media, Members of Parliament (MPs), 
judiciary, and civil society organizations (CSOs). Henceforth, we refer to this meaning simply as 
“accountability.” 
We further distinguish between three sub-types of accountability: 1) Vertical 
accountability captures citizens’ ability to monitor and effectively penalize a government through 
elections and political parties; 2) Horizontal accountability encompasses mechanisms for state 
institutions to oversee the government; 3) Diagonal accountability refers to civil society and 
media overseeing the government directly as well as indirectly by enhancing the effectiveness of 
the other two sub-types [reference blinded for review].  
In the literature, we find an intense debate on the sequence of the beginnings of 
democratization – thus how accountability starts to evolve. For instance, Dahl (1971) argues that 
competition among elites evolves before the expansion of participation to larger parts of the 
society. More recently Wilson (2015: 234) finds empirical support for this notion using sequence 
analysis. In what sequence high levels of de-facto accountability are reached is less in focus.  
To address this gap, we develop a novel theory of the accountability sequence. Building 
on Dahl’s (1971) famous axiom, we argue that governments are more likely to allow for de-facto 
accountability if the costs of supplying accountability decrease and the costs of suppressing the 
demand for accountability increase. We argue that progress in vertical and diagonal accountability 
increases the pressure for horizontal accountability. For instance, the evolution of vertical 
accountability increases the incentive of MPs to demand for more power and thus de-facto 
oversight capacity. Conversely, the evolution of high levels of vertical accountability is less 
dependent on progress in other areas, because voters are not agents in accountability 
relationships. Furthermore, effective horizontal accountability is more costly for governments 
because its key actors such as high courts and MPs are relatively close to the power center. Thus, 
we expect high levels of vertical accountability to develop first and de-facto horizontal 
accountability to develop last.        
Our empirical results support these hypotheses drawing on evidence from 173 countries 
from 1900 to today.  We use the new V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2016 a, b) and novel 
sequencing methods developed by Lindenfors et al. (forthcoming) building on established 
approaches in evolutionary biology. This allows us to offers a distinctive depiction of sequences 
between 35 indicators of accountability.  
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In the next section of the paper we lay out the main theoretical argument. Then follows 
the presentation of the concept and measurement of accountability. The next section discusses 
the empirical analysis. A final section concludes the paper. 
 
II. Theorizing Sequences of Accountability  
It is established knowledge in political science that order, timing, and historical context matter for 
the evolution of complex sets of institutions (e.g. Mahoney 2001, Yashar 1997). Nevertheless, the 
existing literature on sequencing has three main shortcomings: 1) it typically focuses on the place 
and role of one specific institution in a sequential relationship to another (e.g. introducing 
competition before extending suffrage); 2) it does not employ appropriate methods that can 
identify a series of variables related sequentially in longer chains; and 3) it usually analyses the de-
jure introduction of institutions and not their de-facto effectiveness.  
For example, several studies of sequencing related to accountability focus on the timing 
of the introduction of de-jure multiparty elections. On the one side of the argument, Mansfield et 
al.  (2007: 6-7) hold that a premature “out-of sequence” push to hold competitive elections in 
culturally diverse societies without reasonably effective institutions, is likely to fail and even lead 
to violence. Others like Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) also caution against early introduction of 
multiparty elections suggesting that they stabilize and legitimize dictatorships if introduced before 
full competition. Contrary to that view, Carothers (2007: 20-21) reasons stable political 
institutions and accountability mechanisms are more likely to develop “as part and parcel” of the 
process of democratization rather than separate from it. Similarly Howard and Roessler (2006) 
and Lindberg (2006) argue that countries holding repeated elections, even if they are held early 
and in authoritarian contexts, are more successful in democratizing than countries without 
elections.  
Others argues that a powerful legislature must develop first or else a concentration of 
power in the hands of the executive and underdevelopment of political parties inhibits 
democratization (Fish 2005). A case study on the Ukraine supports this notion and shows that 
even in weak democracies, opposition parties in a legislature can hold the executive somewhat to 
account through legislative requests (Herron et al. 2015: 132). On the other hand, scholars have 
found that conflicts between the legislature and the executive may ultimately lead to democratic 
breakdown (Stepan et al. 1993). 
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Furthermore, establishing a robust and active civil society is often viewed as a 
precondition for the subsequent fall of authoritarian regimes, as well as for building a resilient 
democracy (Bernhard 1993). Carothers (2007: 20) points out that the development of strong 
grass root movements (e.g. Solidarity in Poland, the African National Congress in South Africa) 
have often been necessary conditions for democratic change in many countries. Yet, the 
“moderation argument” (Bermeo 1997) poses that mass popular action needs to be curbed 
around the moment of transition in order for democratization to succeed (e.g. Karl 1990, Weiner 
1987, Huntington 1984, Valenzuela 1989).  
However, we have been unable to study interactive relationships involving several 
institutions affecting each other over longer sequential “chains”, due to both a lack of systematic 
and comparable data across a global sample of countries extending over a large number of years, 
as well as methods appropriate for such an endeavor. For example, do powerful and active CSOs 
before holding of elections systematically reinforce the quality of subsequent elections, which 
then push MPs to hold governments to account? Current scholarship has little to say on how 
these institutions evolve in sequential terms.  
Finally, most of the extant literature focus de-jure institutions. However, what really 
matters is how well such institutions are functioning in practice. High levels of de-facto 
accountability may have different causes and consequences than the mere de-jure introduction of 
institutions related to accountability. We will develop this notion more in detail in the following 
section.  
The Implementation Gap: De-jure vs. De-facto Accountability  
It has become conventional wisdom that there is an important difference between the 
introduction of de-jure institutions of accountability and their de-facto implementation (Besley 2006: 
37, Snyder 2006: 219). For instance, the Global Commission on Electoral Integrity (2012: 12) 
chaired by Kofi Annan pointed out that “many authoritarian governments (…) seek to wrap 
themselves in the veneer of democratic legitimacy.” To this end, regimes introduce pro-forma 
institutions but skillfully strip them of their power to constrain the executive (Gandhi et al. 2009). 
For example, almost 90 percent of countries in the world hold de jure multiparty elections 
for national office but less than half of these elections are substantially free and fair (Hafner-
Burton et al. 2013: 152, van Ham & Lindberg 2016, 5f). Breaches range from election day 
manipulations such as stuffing ballot boxes and fabrication of results, to more subtle activities 
 8 
such as informal limitations on media freedom (Schedler 2002). Such practices undermine two 
key preconditions for vertical accountability: procedural certainty and ex ante uncertainty 
(Przeworski 1986: 56–57).  
Another example is the media. Journalists are often severely restricted in practice even 
when freedom of expression and freedom of the press are constitutionally guaranteed. Russia is a 
contemporary example where non-coercive capture of key media outlets by the government 
effectively obstructs critical reporting (Besley et al. 2002: 720). Although the Russian constitution 
formally guarantees freedom of the media, state-controlled companies own all national 
broadcasters, and journalists are in practice submissive to the regime.  
Finally, most nations have parliaments with constitutionally guaranteed oversight 
functions. Yet, many cannot effectively exercise such de-jure prerogatives of scrutinizing the 
executive (Salih 2005, Rakner and van de Walle 2009, Vliet 2014). To the contrary, authoritarian 
governments can use legislatures to co-opt elites and shield governments from criticism (Gandhi 
2008). In many African countries, limited implementation of constitutions and one-party-
dominance undermine the division between legislative and executive powers, which is necessary 
for horizontal accountability (Cranenburgh 2009: 64).  
Perhaps it will just take some time for these newer systems to develop effective 
institutions of accountability. Legislatures were introduced in many European countries already 
before the 20th century, but it was not until much later that they actually developed the power to 
effectively oversee government. For instance, the German emperor established a national 
parliament with oversight rights in 1871, but a strong parliamentary oversight de-facto did not 
evolve until after World War II.3  
The next section develops arguments about the sequence in which high levels of de-facto 
accountability develop over time. 
Closing the Gap: Sequences in the Evolution of Accountability  
The advancement of de-facto accountability is not inevitable. Here we focus on how accountability 
results from a political struggle between the government and accountability actors. By 
accountability actors we mean actors that have an incentive to hold the government to account 
and are principals in vertical, horizontal or diagonal accountability relationships with a 
                                                
3 See V-Dem data on legislative oversight (Coppedge et al. 2016).   
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government.4 This includes citizens, political parties, legislatures, high courts, ombudsman offices 
and other oversight bodies, as well as media, journalists, and CSOs.  
As a baseline approximation, it seems reasonable to assume that agents’ (governments) 
strategic interest is to remain as unconstrained as possible, while principals (accountability actors) 
want to maximize the amount of control they exercise over agents, and hence seek to expand the 
reach of de-facto accountability mechanisms. The government then has to decide whether and to 
what extent to concede to this demand. In an iterative process, it weighs the costs of supplying 
accountability against the cost of suppressing the demand for accountability. This notion builds on Dahl’s 
(1971: 14f) famous theoretical axiom that the likelihood of democratization increases as the cost 
of tolerating opposition decrease and the cost of repression increase. We also adopt the 
modification introduced by Lindberg (2009: 320) that what is relevant is not if the costs are 
higher or lower per see, but if that level of cost is acceptable or not to a particular ruling 
government.  
Fig. 1. The probability of governments allowing the evolution of de-facto accountability  
 
Note: This figure builds on Dahl (1971: 16). 
                                                
4 Downs and Rocke (1994) apply the principle-agent model to the study of governments, where the chief executive is 
the agent of the public – the principal, who controls the agent by being able to remove her from power. 
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Thus, the evolution of specific patterns of accountability is a function of (1) how costly it 
would be for the government to supply improved institutions of accountability - meaning how 
much their room to maneuver would be constrained; and (2) whether governments perceive the 
cost it would incur to suppress the demand for specific types of accountability, as acceptable or 
not.  
(1) The Cost of Supplying Accountability   
Recall that we conceptualize accountability, following Schedler (1999), to have two main 
dimensions: availability of information and power to enforce sanctions. Ultimately, both 
dimensions require that the offices of agents and principals are established, and the domain of 
authority of the agent. Here, we focus on how such institutions of accountability (e.g. elections, 
parliaments) evolve from being in place de-jure to being effective de-facto and functioning as full-
fledged accountability actors. The three sub-types of political accountability – vertical, diagonal 
and horizontal – encompass varying mechanisms to constrain governments. We suggest here that 
because of this variation, one should expect that the sub-types vary in how effective they are in 
the information and sanctions dimensions. Consequently, supplying higher levels of de-facto 
accountability in these respective areas, are associated with varying costs for governments. Table 
1 shows the pattern we expect.  
Table 1. Effectiveness of the three sub-types of de-facto accountability in the information 
and enforcement dimension of accountability    
 Sub-Type of 
Accountability  
Vertical Diagonal Horizontal 
Dimension of 
Accountability 
 
Information  Low High High 
Sanctions High Low High 
Vertical accountability between citizens and government has a sharp edge as enforcement 
tool by voters’ power to “throw the rascals out” at the ballot box if governments perform poorly. 
The consequence of immediately losing power is drastic and we therefore consider the sanction 
capacity of vertical accountability high. However, it is also often considered a “long route” to 
implement accountability (World Bank 2004). Elections provide opportunity for exercising 
accountability only in periodic intervals. Furthermore, ruling elites have multiple instruments to 
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deceive and manipulate the electorate (Schedler 2002) and elections’ effectiveness as an 
instrument for holding leaders accountable even in democracies has been questioned by many 
studies (e.g. Achen and Bartels 2016, Brennan 2016, Evans 2004). Citizens oftentimes are in a 
situation of enormous informational disadvantage, which constrains their ability to judge the 
governments’ actions (Miller 2005: 207). Hence, we consider the information dimension low for 
vertical accountability. 
Conversely, the strength of diagonal accountability mechanisms, when effectively in place, 
lies in the realm of uncovering and providing information. For instance, media are the main 
source of information for many citizens and hence a vital link between the government and 
citizens. Thus, investigative journalists and watch-dog CSOs are key for uncovering unethical 
behavior.  Nevertheless, the success of CSOs and media ultimately depend on whether the 
institutions of vertical and horizontal accountability respond to them (Mainwaring and Welna 
2003). Therefore, we consider the effectiveness of diagonal accountability to in the dimension of 
sanctions as low, whereas it is high in the dimension of information.  
Finally, we argue that horizontal accountability, when realized in practice, is strong on both 
dimensions. First, it is difficult for governments to evade fully effective and independent 
horizontal oversight mechanisms. In most democracies the parliament is a key intermediary 
institution for probing the ruling government (Laver and Shepsle 1999). Self-confident, 
independent and capacitated legislatures, high courts, and other oversight bodies have both 
institutional incentives and power to monitor the actions of the executive on a day-to-basis (Fish 
2005). They cannot be easily deceived and have ways of accessing information not available to 
ordinary citizens. For example, in many countries such as Sweden (National Audit Office) or the 
U.S (Government Accountability Office), independent courts of audit have the right to 
thoroughly scrutinize records of public expenditure. Their reports are important tools for 
parliamentarians and journalists to hold the government to account. Second, powerful 
parliaments – for instance through votes of non-confidence – and high courts through court 
rulings have the power to directly sanction the government.  
Its dual characteristic of effective information and enforcement makes the 
implementation of full de-facto horizontal accountability highly costly for governments. 
Additionally, institutions of horizontal accountability can constrain the government’s day-to-day 
actions. Conversely, actors of vertical and diagonal accountability are further away from the 
center of power and therefore their effectiveness is less costly for governments. 
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 (2) The Cost of Suppressing the Demand for Accountability  
The cost of supplying accountability is only one side of the coin. Additionally, the cost of 
repressing the demand for accountability shapes the propensity of governments to make 
concessions. Since we study the accountability sequence, we are mainly interested in how 
advancements in one sub-type of accountability influence the demand for high-levels of de-facto 
accountability in others. It seems plausible that a strong demand is more costly to repress than a 
weak demand.  
There is evidence that introducing institutions of vertical accountability – even if weak - 
creates a demand for more de-facto accountability of any kind. For example, Lindberg (2006) 
shows that the introduction of de-jure multiparty elections has pushed African countries towards 
greater respect for civil liberties. Gandhi and Lust Okar (2009: 415) argue that repeated 
participation in elections can change citizens’ expectations towards political regimes, encouraging 
them to demand democratic procedures and broader participation. Furthermore, the regular 
holding of elections may prompt actors to believe that democracy is the new game in town, 
which gives them an incentive to them to adhere to democratic norms (Lindberg 2009: 335). This 
includes holding the government to account. At the same time, political competition and a 
minimum level of press freedom enables civil society to push for better quality of government 
(Grimes 2013). 
Building on these notions, we argue that improvements in vertical accountability can increase 
the demand for de-facto horizontal accountability, thus making it more costly for governments to 
repress such demands.  For instance, MPs facing clean elections are more likely to insist that the 
legislature actually gains the power to oversee the government due to two pathways (Fig. 2). First, 
if MPs are forced to actually attract voters in elections they need to have good arguments about 
what they have achieved during their tenure – such as getting the government to implement a 
certain policy or uncovering misuse of public funds. This creates an incentive for MPs to demand 
for more power and thus de-facto horizontal accountability. Second, in clean elections, 
independent and genuine opposition MPs are more likely to have a chance to be elected. 
Furthermore, MPs are likely to be more self-confident, if they have a genuine mandate from 
voters and do not depend on the good will of the government to manipulate elections in their 
favor. In contexts with flawed elections, MPs are often dependent on clientelistic services from 
the government (Lust 2009). Thus, clean elections increase the independence of MPs and hence 
make it less costly for them to demand for more horizontal accountability. Due to both 
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pathways, high levels of vertical accountability are likely to increase the demand for more 
horizontal accountability.  
Fig. 2. Two pathways illustrating how vertical accountability can enhance the demand for 
horizontal accountability   
 
South Korea is one example how vertical accountability can push for greater horizontal 
accountability. The first free and fair parliamentary elections in the country were held in 1988.5 
However, it was not until 1998 that South Korean MPs became more rigorous in overseeing the 
government. In that year a party different from the party of the president held the parliamentary 
majority (Freedom House 1998). Finally, in 2016, citizens staged mass protests against the 
president due to a massive corruption scandal. This pressure from the principals pushed the 
National Assembly to impeach the president.6  
Thus, we expect effective diagonal accountability to create a stronger demand for 
improved horizontal accountability. For instance, independent media outlets are able to give a 
platform to voices criticizing shortcomings in government oversight and for campaigns 
demanding more horizontal accountability. A well-informed, organized and active citizenry is 
likely to push for better governance such as more effective instruments of horizontal 
accountability (Grimes 2013: 381). One successful example of diagonal accountability improving 
horizontal accountability is a campaign by Argentinian CSOs using the media to push for reforms 
in the judicial system in the country. The non-profit organization Asociación Por Los Derechos 
Civiles (ADC) led a coalition of CSOs in a campaign resulting in parliamentary and public 
hearings for Supreme Court of Justice nominees (Fisher 2013: 238). Similarly, CSOs spearheaded 
judicial reforms at provincial level in Argentina. Several CSOs held a preparation course for 
                                                
5 See V-Dem data on Clean elections (v2elfrfair, Coppedge et al. 2016).   
6 See V-Dem data on Legislature investigates executive in practice (v2lginvstp_ord, Coppedge et al. 2016). On this indicator, 
ranging from 0 (“extremely unlikely”) to 4 (“certain”), South Korea is rated 2 or lower from 1989 until 1998, when 
the scores improve to 3. In 2016 the country receives the highest score (4). 
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judicial nominees for the provincial government of Santiago del Estero in 2008. As result, within 
one year, reportedly the selection of judges was removed from political control and now takes 
place under the auspices of the Council of Magistrates, and CSO monitoring (Fisher 2013: 239). 
Thus, we expect self-confident CSOs to push for more transparency and better horizontal 
oversight of governments. Together with independent media this strengthens the demand for 
effective de-facto horizontal accountability.  
Thus, our central argument is that the cost of suppressing the demand for more de-facto 
horizontal accountability depends on advancements in other sub-types of accountability. Conversely, 
the demand for de-facto vertical accountability does not depend as much on other sub-types. Key 
actors in vertical accountability are voters. They are the principals of MPs – at least in contexts 
with clean elections - whereas voters themselves are not at the dependent end of any political 
accountability relationship.7 This makes their incentive and capacity to demand for accountability 
less dependent on advancements in other areas. Disappointed voters can rapidly turn into 
protesters, which gives them a potent tool to demand improvements in vertical accountability 
without much help of other accountability actors.8 For example, in 2010 Nigerians took to the 
streets demanding free and fair elections and the replacement of the head of the Election 
Management Body (EMB) due to his mismanagement of the 2007 elections and alleged partiality 
(Le Van and Ukata 2012). The government gave in, appointed a new and widely respected EMB 
head, who organized much better elections in 2011 (Lewis 2011).  
 
III. Summary and Hypotheses 
To sum up, we argue that governments try to evade being held to account whereas accountability 
actors want more oversight power. Thus, the accountability sequence is shaped by the specific 
costs for governments of giving in to demands for accountability and the strength of these 
demands.   
After the establishment of de-jure institutions of accountability, we expect the initial 
demand for high-levels of de-facto vertical accountability to be stronger than the demands for 
other sub-types.  
                                                
7 However, note that in societies dominated by clientelism a “perverse accountability” relationship can be created 
between citizens and politicians, where citizens are dependent on clientelistic goods (Stokes 2005).  
8 Of course, a free media reporting about citizens’ protests would help their advancement but this is not a necessary 
condition – particular in the digital age - as the recent Arab Spring protests illustrate. People of Egypt, Tunisia and 
Libya took to the streets in 2011 without much reporting in the official media outlets of their country.     
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The incentives and capacities of voters to demand are relatively independent from 
advancements in other sub-types, because – conversely to MPs – they are not at the dependent 
end of an accountability relationship. Giving in to demands for vertical accountability also carries 
limited costs for governments, because voters often lack accurate information about the behavior 
of elected officials, which limits their ability to effectively sanction government in elections. 
Hence, in many cases the cost of repressing the demand for vertical accountability is higher than 
the cost of improving the electoral institutions. Thus,  
H1: High levels of de-facto vertical accountability develop before high levels of other sub-types of de-facto 
accountability. 
In the realm of horizontal accountability, institutions with the capacity to directly oversee 
and constrain governments are most costly for them. Therefore, governments may be ready to 
institutionalize parliaments and high courts, but can be expected to be reluctant to allow such 
institutions to become fully effective. Governments are only likely to make substantive 
concessions in this realm, if the demand would be too costly to repress. Advances in vertical and 
diagonal accountability intensifies this demand, because free and fair elections change the 
incentive structure of MPs and gives CSOs and media the opportunity to pressure for effective 
oversight.  Hence,  
H2: Institutions of horizontal accountability that directly oversee and constraint governments become de-facto fully 
effective relatively late in the sequence – after progress in the diagonal and vertical sub-types.  
 
IV. Concept and Measurement  
Figure 3 maps our conceptualization of accountability and identifies a measurement scheme with 
a combination of factual and evaluative indicators. We distinguish between vertical, horizontal 
and diagonal sub-types of accountability. The distinction between vertical and horizontal 
accountability is commonly found in the literature (O’Donnell 1998). Other authors have added a 
third dimension - social accountability - to capture the important function of civil society and 
media in constraining governments (e.g. Melena et al. 2004). Here, we follow Goetz and Jenkins 
(2010) in terming this sub-type “diagonal,” because this term better reflects its intermediary 
nature. For a more in-depth discussion see [reference blinded for review]. We also consider the 
de-jure existence of institutions potentially enabling accountability separate from the de-facto 
practice. 
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Fig. 3. Accountability and its sub-types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To measure de-facto accountability we primarily rely on V-Dem data, which draws on over 
2,600 country experts (Coppedge et al. 2016a). Version 6.2 of the V-Dem data set provides more 
than 350 distinct indicators on democracy and governance for 173 polities between 1900 and 
2012. Data for 76 countries are available until 2015 and for 37 countries until 2014. V-Dem 
aggregates the expert assessments in a custom-built measurement model, which takes coder 
disagreement and measurement error into account (Pemstein et al. 2016).9 This enhances 
reliability and validity of the data. In the following analysis, unless explicitly mentioned, the data 
come from V-Dem. If V-Dem data on specific de-jure aspects is not available, we use data from 
the Comparative Constitution Project (CCP, Elkins 2014). We present a detailed description of 
the variables in Table A.1. in the Appendix.  
                                                
9 The measurement model produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval 
scale (Coppedge et al 2016: 33). As the sequencing models require ordinal variables, we use the transformed ordinal 
version of the V-Dem variables.  
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De-facto
Multi-party elections
de-facto
Party barriers de-facto
EMB autonomy
Programmatic party links
Opposition party autonomy
Clean elections
Vote buying
De-jure
Electoral regime
Multi-party elections
de-jure
Party ban de-jure
Universal su↵rage
De-facto
Legislature investigates
executive de-facto
Legislature control resources
Court independence
de-facto
Judiciary accountable
Executive oversight
by other bodies
De-jure
Legislature exists
Legislature investigates
executive de-jure
Judiciary independent
de-jure
Ombudsman, attorney general
prosecutor exist
De-facto
Media censorship
Critical media
Media wide range of views
CSO repression
Wide involvement in CSOs
Engaged society
CSO entry and exit
Freedom of discussion
De-jure
Freedom of assembly
by Constitution
Freedom of expression
by Constitution
Freedom of the press
by Constitution
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We now discuss concept and measurement of each accountability sub-type in turn. 
Vertical accountability concerns the relationship between the citizens and their elected 
representatives (Fox 2015, Mainwaring 2003). Through voting for competing candidates, voters 
exert control over politicians. Faced with the uncertainty of re-election, incumbents aim to meet 
voters’ expectations (Olson 2000). Political parties are important for vertical accountability as 
stronger and more organized parties can enforce constraints on governments’ behavior, aiming to 
implement programmatic goals and prevent illicit activities that would hurt the party’s reputation 
(Gehlbach et al. 2011; Svolik 2012).  
We use four indicators to capture the de-jure aspects of vertical accountability. First, the 
variable Electoral regime indicates whether regularly scheduled elections for parliament and for the 
chief executive are on course or if they are interrupted due to a coup, military defeat or similar. 
Second, we consider whether it is legally possible for parties not affiliated with the government to 
form (Party ban de-jure). Thirdly, we identify if laws allow for multiple parties to register for the 
elections (Multiparty elections de-jure), and fourthly, if elections were held under universal suffrage 
(Share of population with suffrage).10  
Second, to capture the de-facto aspect of vertical accountability, we use seven indicators. 
The first measures the extent to which electoral contestation is truly multiparty in practice 
(Multiparty elections de-facto) and, second, the degree to which freedom to form political parties is 
unrestricted (Party barriers de-facto). Furthermore, we use measures of to what extent the electoral 
management body (EMB) has the autonomy from the government to apply election laws 
impartially (EMB autonomy); an indicator of to what extent elections are free and fair and not 
marred by fundamental flaws and irregularities (Clean elections), and fifth, to what extent Vote 
buying occurs. In order to capture the functioning of political parties, we include an indicator on 
the extent political parties are based on programs versus clientelistic linkages (Party linkages). 
Finally, we capture Opposition parties autonomy from the government, in order to determine if voters 
have a choice. 
The oversight exercised between state institutions is commonly termed horizontal 
accountability (O’Donnel 1998). Such separation of power and should ensure that checks 
between institutions prevent abuse of power (Rose-Ackerman 1996). Examples of institutions of 
horizontal accountability are legislative, and judicial branches, as well as various oversight 
                                                
10 We define virtual universal suffrage to be achieved when 98% of the population is enfranchised - as is common 
practice in the field (Skaaning 2015).  
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agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor generals. (O’Donnel 1998: 119). We focus here on how 
these institutions oversee the government (and not each other).  
In order to measure the de-jure horizontal aspects of accountability, we use indicators 
from the CCP data set on the existence of government oversight bodies. First, we account for 
whether a Legislature exists, and, second, whether the legislature is allowed to question the 
government (Legislature questions executive de-jure). Third, we capture if there is Judicial independence by 
constitution and, fourth, whether provisions for an Attorney general/ prosecutor exist.   
To measure de-facto horizontal accountability, we use the following indicators. First, we 
capture the likelihood that the Legislature investigates [the] executive in practice and issues a report 
unfavorable to the government if needed, and if the Legislature controls resources for its own 
operations. Second, we gauge the likelihood that other bodies such as a comptroller general, 
general prosecutor, or ombudsman would conduct such an investigation (Executive oversight by other 
bodies). Third, we take into account to what extent judges are subject to disciplinary action (Judicial 
accountability), and, finally, the High/Low court independence from the government. 
Diagonal accountability reflects how civil society actors constrain the government 
either directly or indirectly via providing information for other accountability actors or 
pressurizing them (Goetz and Jenkins 2010). Media empowers citizens to make informed political 
choices (Voltmer 2009: 139). A robust civil society is a critical to hold governments accountable 
beyond elections (Besley 2006; Johnston 2005; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). In particular, 
CSOs are important for increasing the political awareness and impact of their members (Lipset et 
al. 1956). 
To describe de-jure diagonal accountability, we use three CCP indicators reflecting whether 
there is Freedom of assembly; Freedom of expression and Freedom of the press by constitution.  
For de-facto diagonal accountability, we include indicators measuring Media censorship; 
whether media outlets regularly criticize the government (Critical media); and the extent to which 
media represent a wide range of political perspectives (Media wide range of views). Three additional 
indicators capture civic action: the extent to which CSOs are free to organize, associate, strike, 
express themselves (CSO entry and exit), and to criticize the government without fear of negative 
consequences (CSO repression); an indicator of how wide and how independent are public 
deliberations when important policy changes are being considered (Engaged society); and finally, to 
what degree there is Wide involvement in CSOs and participation is voluntary.  
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V. Empirical Analysis  
Methodology  
To test our hypotheses, we use a set of novel analytical approaches only now being introduced to 
the field of political science (Lindenfors et al 2016; Lindenfors forthcoming; Wang et al. 2017). In 
particular, we use the following two sequencing methods: 1) graphical investigation of the exact 
pathways for how variables change in relation to one another; and 2) dependency analysis, 
exploring whether the values of one variable are systematically conditional on certain values of 
other variables.  
The latter method is inspired by “the contingent states test”, developed to investigate 
dependencies in biological evolution (Sillén-Tullberg 1993). For highest value of each indicator, 
we scan the dataset for the lowest value of all other variables. In order to reduce the risk that 
outliers drive our results, we exclude the lowest 5% of observations following the convention 
(Lindenfors et al 2016:10).  
The method combines a series of bivariate analysis, and thus, establishes a long series of 
sequences involving many multi-state variables. If high values in Variable A always correspond to 
a certain minimal value of Variable B, then it can be inferred that the high values of Variable A 
are likely to be conditional on this minimal value of Variable B. Conversely, if for the highest 
value of Variable B, the corresponding value of Variable A is its minimum, then this shows that 
Variable B is not contingent on Variable A. The result is a detailed and empirically based map of 
which aspects of a phenomenon occurs before others.  
For our analyses here, we construct so-called dependency tables, which indicate how our 
accountability indicators have developed in relation to each other. We identify the lowest value of 
each accountability indicator, which has been reached historically in virtually all countries before 
the highest value of the variable in question was reached. The sum of these minimum values is 
called contingency conditions. A low number of contingency conditions for a variable indicates 
that it assumed its highest level before much progress in other aspects has been made. 
Conversely, a high number of dependencies for a variable indicate that it cannot fully develop 
before many other variables have reached high levels.  
When interpreting the results one should not draw any strong conclusions from small 
differences in the number of dependencies and contingency conditions presented in such a table, 
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but we could draw inferences on sequence mechanisms from large differences (Lindenfors 2016: 
24).  
One strong advantage of this method is that - unlike in time-series cross-section analysis - 
the sequencing approach does not focus on average effects. Rather, the analyses tells us that one 
aspect never emerged before another one – in our case never in the history since 1900, across 
some 17,500 country-years. This is arguably rather strong evidence that it is unlikely to ever 
happen. Thus, we can present evidence on which aspects develop first, in the middle, and last in 
the processes of building accountability. 
Global Trends 
The following analysis investigates how the 35 individual accountability indicators evolved in 
relation to one another in virtually all countries from 1900 to today. Table 3 presents the 
aggregate summary of 595 bivariate analyses following the dependency analysis approach outlined 
above, displaying the sum of contingency conditions for each of the variables reaching their 
highest value (the top category) with a 5% cut-off point. For selected indicators more detailed 
dependency tables can be found in Table A.3 in the Appendix.  
The first thing to note is that almost all de-jure indicators have very few dependencies. 
This reflects the fact that several countries had achieved most aspects of de-jure accountability 
before making much progress on any de-facto aspects. The only exception is the formal 
establishment of an ombudsman office, which comes relatively late in the sequence. 
We expect de-facto vertical accountability to evolve first in the accountability sequence 
(H1). Our findings partially support this hypothesis. Most indicators of de-facto vertical 
accountability require fewer contingencies than indicators of the horizontal and diagonal sub-
type. The sequence pattern demonstrates that improving vertical accountability by diminishing 
Vote buying in elections can be achieved very early. Similarly, the evidence in Table 3 reveals that 
getting Multiparty elections de-facto and transforming Party linkages from clientelistic to programmatic 
can also be achieved very early in the sequence of developing the three types of accountability 
mechanisms.  
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Table 3. Dependency table indicating the minimum number of contingency conditions required 
for reaching each accountability indicator’s highest value  
De-facto/ 
De-jure 
Type of 
accountability Indicator name 
Contingency 
conditions (max. 127) 
De-facto Horizontal Legislature investigates executive in practice 62 
De-facto Horizontal Executive oversight by other bodies 57 
De-facto Horizontal High court independence 54 
De-facto Diagonal Engaged society 48 
De-facto Diagonal Media censorship 48 
De-facto Vertical EMB autonomy 47 
De-facto Diagonal CSO entry and exit 42 
De-facto Diagonal Freedom of discussion 38 
De-facto Diagonal Critical media 37 
De-facto Diagonal CSO repression 37 
De-facto Diagonal Media wide range of views 34 
De-facto Diagonal Wide involvement in CSOs 30 
De-facto Vertical Opposition parties autonomy 27 
De-facto Vertical Clean elections 25 
De-facto Vertical Party barriers de-facto 25 
De-facto Horizontal Lower court independence 24 
De-jure Horizontal Ombudsman exists 23 
De-facto Horizontal Legislature controls resources 17 
De-facto Vertical Multiparty elections de-facto 17 
De-facto Horizontal Judicial accountability 13 
De-facto Vertical Party linkages 10 
De-jure Vertical Party ban de-jure 6 
De-jure Vertical Multiparty elections de-jure 6 
De-jure Vertical Executive electoral regime index 5 
De-facto Vertical Vote buying 5 
De-jure Diagonal Freedom of the press by constitution 4 
De-jure Horizontal Legislature exists 3 
De-jure Vertical Electoral regime 3 
De-jure Vertical Legislative electoral regime index 3 
De-jure Horizontal Attorney general/ prosecutor exist 3 
De-jure Diagonal Freedom of expression by constitution 3 
De-jure Horizontal Legislature questions executive de-jure 2 
De-jure Horizontal Judicial independence by constitution 2 
De-jure Diagonal Freedom of assembly by constitution 2 
De-jure Vertical Share of population with suffrage 1 
Note: Contingency conditions indicate the minimal sum of values on all other accountability indicators achieved in 
virtually all countries from 1900 to today before reaching the highest value on the indicator in question.        
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However, there are two exceptions to the pattern that high levels of vertical 
accountability develop first. First, three indicators capturing aspects of horizontal accountability 
have fewer dependencies than key indicators of vertical accountability. These indicators are: Lower 
court independence, Legislature controls resources, and Judicial accountability. All three aspects are important 
for strengthening actors of horizontal accountability, but do not immediately threaten the 
government, compared to other much sharper tools such as High court independence. Thus, this 
finding does not challenge our theoretical assumptions.  
Second, full EMB autonomy requires more contingency conditions than all other aspects of 
vertical accountability and most indicators of diagonal accountability. Thus, the “last holdout” for 
governments in the area of vertical accountability seems to be influencing the management of 
elections. This is plausible, because restricting EMB autonomy is a low-cost way of manipulating 
elections (Schedler 2013:274). 
The indicators of de-facto diagonal accountability cluster together in the upper half of the 
contingency table, which indicates that they require more progress than most indicators of 
vertical accountability. Furthermore, virtually no country in the world has fully ended CSO 
repression before achieving at least medium levels of Freedom of discussion, Clean elections and Critical 
media.11  
Figure 2 presents the bivariate relationship between two key variables of diagonal and 
vertical accountability: Media censorship (y-axis) and De-facto multiparty elections (x-axis). Higher values 
of the variables indicate that the government is more accountable. The size of the dots on Figure 
2 signifies the frequency of country-years with a particular combination of values. Bigger sizes of 
the bubbles indicate a higher frequency of the particular combination. Thus, the relatively small 
dots to the left of the diagonal line indicate that only few cases have accomplished an un-
censored media before De-facto multiparty elections. The arrows on Figure 2 illustrate the pathways 
of countries moving from one combination of indicators to another. Thick arrows indicate that 
such pathway occurred more often than pathways with thin arrows. The fact that there is no 
strong direct connection between the lowest and highest states of any indicator suggests that 
high-levels of these aspects of de-facto accountability evolve in a sequential process and not over 
night. Almost all high values on Media censorship occur when De-facto multiparty elections has already 
reached the highest value.  
                                                
11 See Table A.3 that documents the specific contingencies for selected individual indicators. Contingency tables for 
the remaining indicators are available upon request.  
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Fig. 2. Development of key indicators of diagonal and vertical accountability. 
 
We expect institutions of de-facto horizontal accountability that directly oversee and 
constraint governments to become fully effective de-facto relatively late in the sequence (H2). 
Our findings support this hypothesis (Table 3). All indicators of diagonal and vertical 
accountability have fewer contingencies than the three key indicators of horizontal accountability. 
They capture if it is likely that a) the legislature and b) other bodies (such as ombudsman, 
comptroller general or prosecutor) would conduct an investigation of the executive potentially 
leading to an unfavorable report or decision; and c) the likelihood that the high court would rule 
independently on cases salient to the government, regardless of the government’s position.  
Table 3 provides evidence that no country has scored high on these three indicators 
without achieving significant progress in many other mechanisms of accountability. The 
legislature and other bodies can effectively hold the executive to account, and the high court can 
issue rulings independently only in an environment in which politicians are subject to regular and 
clean elections, citizens are free to organize themselves and express their political will through 
political parties and independent CSOs, and the media is able to scrutinize the work of the 
government.12 This finding supports our second hypothesis that effective institutions of de-facto 
horizontal accountability develop last in the accountability sequence.  
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate this finding. Figure 3 shows the development of the variables 
Legislature investigates executive in practice (y-axis) and Clean elections (x-axis). The bigger bubbles on 
                                                
12 See Table A.3 documenting the specific contingency conditions for selected individual indicators. Dependency 
tables for the remaining indicators are available upon request.   
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right of the diagonal line indicate that, historically, countries have started holding clean elections 
before the legislature could investigate the executive.  
Fig. 3. Development of key indicators in horizontal and vertical accountability. 
 
Similarly, when we look at the combination of values of two key variables from diagonal and 
horizontal accountability (Figure 4), we see that Freedom of discussion (diagonal accountability) 
develops higher values earlier than High court independence (horizontal accountability). 
Fig. 4. Development of key indicators of diagonal and horizontal accountability.  
 
Thus, the results from Figure 3 and 4, and Table 3 support the theoretical expectations that de-
facto diagonal and vertical accountability facilitates high levels of horizontal accountability.   
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How accountability evolved in Ghana 
These general findings based on 115 years of data from 173 countries also tally well with country 
experiences. Consider, for example, Ghana that after eleven years of dictatorship, returned to an 
electoral regime in the fall of 1992. The new constitution installed de-jure provisions for 
accountability immediately. The first presidential poll in 1992 was split between the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC, 58%) and other candidates (42%). Most of the losing vote went to 
the Danquah-Busia legatee of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which refused to accept the 
outcome (Morrison 1999). The 1992 elections were somewhat free and fair, largely free of vote 
buying, and barriers for parties to form and participate were low. But there was evidence of 
irregularities and questions about the autonomy of the EMB (Gyimah-Boadi 2001; Lindberg 
2003; Nugent 2001). Despite these problems, after the election, the legislature headed by a well-
known liberal, Justice D. F. Annan, asserted its independence in control over its own resources.  
With the 1996 elections, opposition party autonomy was beyond doubt, and lower courts  
were clearly independent of the regime even though the ruling NDC and its leader President 
Rawlings remained in power. A fully independent and critical media that would openly challenge 
the sitting government did not develop until around the third elections in 2000. The opposition 
party NPP then won both a narrow majority in parliament, and the presidential office. Despite 
this electoral turnover, the legislature was still not fully capable of exercising executive oversight 
and conducting real investigations of illicit behavior by the executive. The new President Kufour 
and his government even actively sought and managed to minimize the reach of the legislature’s 
oversight power and continued doing so into the party’s second term from 2005 to 2008. The 
most important explanation for this circumvention of the legislature is to be found in the strategy 
of the President Kufour to coopt members of the legislature in order to reduce political 
competition (Lindberg 2009). As illustrated by the history of Ghana, many governments across 
the world resist full de-facto horizontal accountability for as long as they can, even if they came to 
power in clean elections.  
Regional and Time Trends 
To assess the scope conditions of our findings we explore patterns of accountability development 
by time and by regions. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of electoral authoritarian 
regimes has surged. During the first and second wave of democratization this practice was not as 
widespread. It seems plausible that this trend is reflected in different sequencing patterns. 
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Therefore, we split the sample into two parts: One including all countries in 1988 or earlier and 
one with all countries after 1988. Based on the methods described above, Table 4 lists the de-
facto accountability indicators sorted in descending order with the indicators with the highest 
number of dependencies at the top of the list, and the lowest at the bottom.  
Most key findings from the general patterns are similar to the results described for the 
global sample. In particular, it is noteworthy that the three mechanisms of horizontal 
accountability that directly oversee and constrain the degree of freedom of governments are on 
top of the dependency table for both before and after the Cold War. These aspects of horizontal 
accountability require most other aspects to be relatively highly developed de-facto in both time 
periods. Thus, the fundamental post-cold war transitions did not affect the reluctance of 
governments to give-in on these issues.  
Second, however, there are instructive differences between the two samples in terms of 
some vertical accountability mechanisms. Before 1988, two important indicators of de-facto 
vertical accountability - Clean elections and programmatic Party linkages – are at a similar spot in the 
sequence as Multi-party elections de-facto. Such aspects often developed hand-in-hand. However, 
after the end of the Cold War, the development of Clean elections and non-clientelistic Party linkages 
seems to require considerable more progress in other aspects of accountability than Multi-party 
elections de-facto. This could be linked to the emergence of a larger number of electoral autocracies 
in the latter period, which only improve the quality of elections – if at all - after internal as well 
external pressure (Lindberg 2006, Schedler 2013).           
Third, in the period after 1988 Lower court independence developed last in the sequence, 
whereas for the earlier time period it can be found in the middle of the dependency table. This 
finding suggests that countries that developed accountability after 1988 had to struggle with a 
legacy of weak low courts. 
We also disaggregate the analysis by splitting the sample by world regions in order to 
investigate regional trends. Tables A.2 in the Appendix shows the results from this analysis 
including a more detailed discussion. Importantly, the key findings from the global sequence of 
variables hold across regions. The variables necessitating the lowest number of contingency 
conditions tend to be associated with vertical accountability; many diagonal accountability 
indicators are concentrated in the middle of the table, and the aspects that come at the latest 
stage of development (or are not achieved yet) reflect horizontal accountability. Thus, a specific 
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region does not drive the results in the global sample but there is a global pattern of the sequence 
in which accountability developed. 
Table 4. Dependency table of accountability mechanisms by time period  
1988 or earlier After 1988  
Indicator name 
Contingency 
conditions  
Indicator name 
Contingency 
conditions  
Legislature investigates in 
practice 
63 Lower court independence 62 
Executive oversight 61 Executive oversight 59 
Engaged society 58 High court independence 57 
High court independence 52 
Legislature investigates in 
practice 
55 
Media censorship 50 Party linkages 52 
EMB autonomy 48 Media censorship 51 
CSO entry and exit 47 Engaged society 50 
Freedom of discussion 37 EMB autonomy 49 
Critical media 34 Clean elections 44 
Media wide range of views 32 Critical media 43 
CSO repression 30 CSO entry and exit 42 
Wide involvement in CSOs 30 Freedom of discussion 42 
Opposition parties autonomy 23 CSO repression 41 
De-facto barriers to parties 20 De-facto barriers to parties 37 
Lower court independence 19 Media wide range of views 36 
Clean elections 14 Wide involvement in CSOs 35 
Judicial accountability 13 Legislature controls resources 35 
Legislature controls resources 11 Opposition parties autonomy 35 
Multi-party elections de-facto 11 Multi-party elections de-facto 26 
Party linkages 6 Judicial accountability 22 
Election vote buying 4 Election vote buying 8 
Note: Contingency conditions indicate the minimal sum of values on all other accountability indicators achieved in 
virtually all countries from 1900 to today before reaching the highest value on the indicator in question.        
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VI. Conclusion  
Our paper breaks new ground in understanding how governments become more accountable de-
facto focusing on three sub-types of accountability – vertical, horizontal and diagonal. We argue 
that governments are more likely to allow for de-facto accountability if the costs of supplying 
accountability decrease and the costs of suppressing the demand for accountability increase. 
Based on this notion, governments are more likely to make initial concessions in the vertical sub-
type of accountability (voters, political parties), because this sub-type is less effective in directly 
constraining their actions and thus less costly than de-facto horizontal accountability (judiciary, 
MPs, other oversight bodies). Furthermore, since voters are not agents in accountability 
relationships their incentive to demand for more influence is less contingent on advances in other 
sub-types. Conversely, the incentive of MPs as key agents of horizontal accountability to demand 
for more oversight power increases with more vertical and diagonal accountability (CSOs, 
media).  
Using novel sequencing methods, we present new evidence on how accountability has 
evolved in 173 countries from 1900 until the present. Our findings support our theoretical 
assumption and uncover the following empirical trends. High levels of de-facto accountability in 
the realm of vertical accountability can evolve before other types of accountability. Effective 
horizontal accountability is contingent on progress in vertical and diagonal accountability. 
Without fully clean elections, autonomous opposition parties and a developed civil society and 
media, virtually no country in the world has ever achieved effective government oversight 
through independent high courts, vigorous parliaments or other institutions.  
These findings have important policy implications. Efforts seeking to enhance horizontal 
accountability, such as the legislature’s de-facto power, are very unlikely to be fully successful 
unless a series of other mechanisms of accountability are in place. International efforts to 
improve elections, the situation of opposition parties and media can have positive repercussions 
for other areas of accountability as well.  
In sum, the novel sequencing methods utilized in this paper make an important 
contribution to our understanding of endogenous patterns of accountability evolution. Future 
research should also examine the role of exogenous factors – such as international interventions 
or economic development – in these sequential developments.   
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Appendix  
Table A.1. Variable names and question text. 
Variable name and tag Note Clarification/full question text Source 
Vertical 
accountability            
 
De-jure vertical 
accountability         
   Electoral regime (v2x_elecreg)  
At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections 
on course, as stipulated by election law or well-
established precedent?  
V-Dem 
   
Multi-party elections de-jure 
(v2elmulpar) 
First two categories 
of v2elmulpar 
Is it legally possible for multiple parties to run in 
elections? V-Dem 
   Party ban de-jure (v2psbars) 
First two categories 
of v2psbars Are there legal barriers to forming a party? V-Dem 
   Universal suffrage (v2elsuffrage) 98% is 1, less is 0 
What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by 
statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections? V-Dem 
 
De-facto vertical 
accountability         
   
Multi-party elections de-facto 
(v2elmulpar) Categories 2, 3, 4 Are multiparty elections being held in practice? V-Dem 
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   Party barriers de-facto (v2psbars) Categories 2, 3, 4 
Barriers include legal requirements such as 
requirements for membership or financial deposits, as 
well as harassment. 
V-Dem 
   EMB autonomy (v2elembaut)  
Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election 
day, and the post-election process into account, would 
you consider this national election to be free and fair?  
V-Dem 
   
Programmatic party links 
(v2psprlnks)  
A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” 
that the party offers in exchange for political support 
and participation in party activities. 
V-Dem 
   
Opposition parties autonomy 
(v2psoppaut)  
Are opposition parties independent and 
autonomous of the ruling regime? An opposition 
party is any party that is not part of the government, 
i.e., that has no control over the executive. 
V-Dem 
   Clean elections (v2elfrfair)  
Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election 
day, and the post-election process into account, would 
you consider this national election to be free and fair?  
V-Dem 
   Vote buying (v2elvotbuy)  
Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of 
money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups 
in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or 
whom to vote for. It does not include legislation 
targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., “porkbarrel” 
legislation. 
V-Dem 
Horizontal 
accountability          
 
De-jure 
horizontal 
accountability  
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   Legislature exists (v2lgbicam)  
 Is there a legislature in place? Advisory bodies that do 
not have the formal authority to legislate–as stipulated 
by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or 
common law precedent–are not considered legislatures.   
V-Dem 
   
Legislature investigates executive de-
jure (INTEXEC)  
Does the legislature have the power to interpellate 
members of the executive branch, or similarly, is the 
executive responsible for reporting its activities to the 
legislature on a regular basis? 
CCP 
   
Judiciary independent de-jure 
(JUDIND)  
Does the constitution contain an explicit declaration 
regarding the independence of the central judicial 
organ(s)? 
CCP 
   
Ombudsman, attorney general, 
prosecutor exist (ATGEN, 
OMBUDS)  
Does the constitution provide for an ombudsman, 
attorney general or public prosecutor? CCP 
 
De-facto 
horizontal 
accountability  
       
   
Legislature investigates executive de-
facto (v2lginvstp)  
If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, 
illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a 
legislative body would conduct an investigation that 
would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable 
to the executive? 
V-Dem 
   
Legislature controls resources 
(v2lgfunds)  
In practice, does the legislature control the resources 
that finance its own internal operations and the 
perquisites of its members? 
V-Dem 
   
High court/lower court 
independence (v2juhcind, v2juncind)  
When the high/lower court in the judicial system is 
ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how 
often would you say that it makes decisions that merely 
reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view 
of the legal record?  
V-Dem 
   Judicial accountability (v2juaccnt)  
When judges are found responsible for serious 
misconduct, how often are they removed from their 
posts or otherwise disciplined?  
V-Dem 
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Executive oversight by other bodies 
(v2lgotovst)  
If executive branch officials were engaged in 
unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely 
is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a 
comptroller general, general prosecutor, or 
ombudsman, would question or investigate them and 
issue an unfavorable decision or report? 
V-Dem 
Social 
accountability          
 
De-jure social 
accountability         
   
Freedom of assembly de-jure 
(ASSEM)  
Does the constitution provide for freedom of 
assembly? CCP 
   
Freedom of expression de-jure 
(EXPRESS)  
Does the constitution provide for freedom of 
expression or speech? CCP 
   
Freedom of the press de-jure 
(PRESS)  
Does the constitution provide for freedom of the 
press? CCP 
 
De-facto social 
accountability         
   Media censorship (v2mecenefm)  
Indirect forms of censorship might include politically 
motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, 
withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing 
facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution 
of advertising, onerous registration requirements, 
prohibitive tariffs, and bribery. 
V-Dem 
   Critical media (v2mecrit)  
Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many 
routinely criticize the government? V-Dem 
   
Media wide range of views 
(v2merange)  
Do the major print and broadcast media represent a 
wide range of political perspectives? V-Dem 
   CSO repression (v2csreprss)  
Does the government attempt to repress civil society 
organizations (CSOs)? V-Dem 
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Wide involvement in CSOs 
(v2csprtcpt)  
Is participation in civil society organizations (CSOs) 
voluntary and is there wide popular involvement?  V-Dem 
   Engaged society (v2dlengage)  
When important policy changes are being considered, 
how wide and how independent are public 
deliberations? 
V-Dem 
   CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs)  
To what extent does the government achieve control 
over entry and exit by civil society organizations 
(CSOs) into public life? 
V-Dem 
   Freedom of discussion (v2xcl_disc)  
This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are 
able to engage in private discussions, particularly on 
political issues, in private homes and public spaces 
(restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work 
etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of 
the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in 
restrictions by the government and its agents but also 
cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced 
by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal 
ways. 
V-Dem 
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Regional Trends 
We split the sample by world regions in order to investigate regional trends.1 Table A.2 lists the de-facto accountability indicators sorted in 
descending order with the indicators with the highest number of dependencies at the top of the list, and the lowest at the bottom.2  
Key findings from the sequence of variables in the global sample hold across regions. The variables that necessitate the lowest number of 
conditions tend to be associated with vertical accountability (indicators displayed in red in the table); many diagonal accountability indicators 
(displayed in green) are concentrated in the middle of the table, and for most regions the indicators that come at the latest stage of development 
reflect horizontal accountability (blue indicators). Some exceptions to this pattern in Table 6 can also be found in the global sample: e.g. 
establishing autonomous EMB comes relatively late in time, while in some regions progress in terms of horizontal accountability, like financial 
independence of the legislature and judicial accountability, comes before reaching high levels on any other mechanisms of accountability. While 
the exact ordering sometimes varies a little, the indicators at the bottom, the middle, and at the top in the three types of accountability are the 
same as in the global analysis for most regions.  
There are a number of interesting differences in the progress of accountability mechanisms across regions. First, in some regions no country has 
reached the highest level on all accountability indicators. These are crossed-out in Table A.2. For example, no government has yet fully given up 
on media censorship or enabled the legislature to effectively investigate in practice in the MENA region (here including Turkey and Israel).  
Second, the pattern of development of vertical accountability seems to differ across regions. In most regions, vote buying is eradicated relatively 
early. However, in Western countries as well as in the Caribbean, vote buying persists longer than other deficits in vertical accountability – with 
the 
exc
eption of EMB autonomy, which has been fully realized relatively late in the sequence everywhere. EMB autonomy comes particularly late in the 
sequence in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, indicating that there governments have kept a backdoor for electoral manipulation open longer 
than other instruments for limiting accountability. Finally, Clean elections are achieved rather late in the MENA region (if at all) and unlike in 
other regions, countries from the Caribbean have not developed programmatic relationships between political parties and citizens early in the 
sequence.  
                                                
1 To divide the countries, we have used a politico-geographical classification scheme (e_regionpol) from the V-Dem data set v6 (taken from QoG 2013). We dropped the 
Pacific region (excluding Australia and New Zealand) due to the low number of countries and cases. 
2 Table A. documents the full table with number of contingency conditions for each region. 
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Thus, interventions to help make the EMB fully autonomous should be synchronized with efforts to strengthen the other mechanisms of 
vertical accountability too. On the other hand, vote buying is something that can be addressed early in most regions of the world where weak 
mechanisms of accountability is an issue, and regardless of the state of other mechanisms being in place or not. 
There are also some interesting differences across regions with regards to horizontal accountability. Notably, no country from Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia has reached full judicial accountability – a measure of whether judges are held 
accountable for possible illegal actions - before making substantial progress in many other aspects of accountability. This is one instance where 
the disaggregated, regional analysis is very useful. Because of the fact that in a minority of regions (e.g. Western Europe) judicial accountability 
developed to a high degree early, the global analysis “hides” that in most of the regions it is actually an aspect of accountability that comes very 
late in the sequence.  
Similarly, lower court independence was developed relatively late in the sequence in regions in the world covering a substantial number of 
countries (Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, East and South Asia), but in other regions it had a relatively low number of 
contingency conditions. While the present analysis cannot provide an answer to why these regional differences occur, it is important to note 
these exceptions to the global pattern if and when the analyses here are used to make policy recommendations. 
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Table A.2. Sequence analysis of accountability mechanisms by region, detailed. 
Eastern Europe 
and Central 
Asia 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
Latin America 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
MENA 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
Western Europe 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
Judicial 
accountability 75 Executive oversight 75 Media censorship 
Highest score 
not reached 
Judicial 
accountability 66 Executive oversight 70 
Executive 
oversight 70 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
66 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
Highest score 
not reached EMB autonomy 50 Ombudsman 70 
Media censorship 66 Lower court independence 60 Executive oversight 64 Engaged society 48 Engaged society 66 
Lower court 
independence 62 
High court 
independence 54 Engaged society 57 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
42 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
63 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
61 Engaged society 52 CSO repression 46 Media censorship 40 Media censorship 61 
High court 
independence 61 CSO entry and exit 49 
High court 
independence 46 
Freedom of 
discussion 39 
Judicial 
accountability 61 
Engaged society 59 Ombudsman 49 EMB autonomy 46 Executive oversight 38 CSO entry and exit 58 
EMB autonomy 56 EMB autonomy 48 Clean elections 45 High court independence 36 
High court 
independence 58 
Wide 
involvement in 
CSOs 
53 Media censorship 40 Wide involvement in CSOs 43 CSO entry and exit 33 EMB autonomy 58 
Critical media 50 Freedom of discussion 40 CSO entry and exit 42 Critical media 29 Critical media 57 
CSO entry and 
exit 47 
Media wide range 
of views 36 Ombudsman 42 
Media wide range 
of views 27 
Media wide range 
of views 57 
Media wide range 
of views 41 
Wide involvement 
in CSOs 34 
Freedom of 
discussion 37 CSO repression 26 
Lower court 
independence 57 
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Opposition 
parties autonomy 41 Critical media 29 Critical media 36 Ombudsman 21 Vote buying 57 
Freedom of 
discussion 41 
Programmatic party 
links 27 
Lower court 
independence 35 
Wide involvement 
in CSOs 17 
Judicial 
independence 56 
Ombudsman 36 Party barriers de-facto 27 
Media wide range 
of views 31 
Opposition parties 
autonomy 16 
Freedom of 
discussion 56 
CSO repression 35 CSO repression 25 Party barriers de-facto 24 
Party barriers de-
facto 16 CSO repression 55 
Clean elections 31 Opposition parties autonomy 21 
Opposition parties 
autonomy 22 
Programmatic party 
links 14 
Wide involvement 
in CSOs 55 
Multi-party 
elections de-facto 29 Clean elections 17 
Programmatic party 
links 19 
Legislature controls 
resources 13 
Programmatic party 
links 55 
Party barriers de-
facto 27 
Legislature controls 
resources 15 
Multi-party 
elections de-facto 17 
Multi-party 
elections de-facto 12 
Opposition parties 
autonomy 52 
Executive 
electoral regime 11 
Multi-party 
elections de-facto 15 
Judicial 
accountability 11 
Lower court 
independence 11 Clean elections 52 
Multi-party 
elections de-jure 10 Vote buying 14 Legislature exists 10 
Executive electoral 
regime 8 
Party barriers de-
facto 49 
Attorney general, 
Prosecutor 10 
Judicial 
accountability 12 
Legislature controls 
resources 10 
Freedom of 
expression 7 
Freedom of 
expression 49 
Vote buying 9 Party barriers de-jure 9 
Party barriers de-
jure 9 
Attorney general, 
Prosecutor 6 
Legislature controls 
resources 48 
Party barriers de-
jure 8 
Freedom of 
expression 7 Vote buying 8 
Multi-party 
elections de-jure 5 
Legislature 
investigates 
executive 
47 
Judicial 
independence 8 
Attorney general, 
Prosecutor 7 
Multi-party 
elections de-jure 7 
Freedom of 
assembly 5 Suffrage 44 
Legislature 
controls 
resources 
7 Multi-party elections de-jure 6 Electoral regime 5 Legislature exists 4 
Party barriers de-
jure 40 
Programmatic 
party links 7 
Legislative electoral 
regime 5 
Legislative electoral 
regime 5 Clean elections 4 
Multi-party 
elections de-facto 40 
Freedom of 
expression 7 Electoral regime 5 
Attorney general, 
Prosecutor 5 Vote buying 4 
Multi-party 
elections de-jure 37 
Legislature 
investigates 
executive 
6 Freedom of the press 5 
Freedom of 
expression 5 
Party barriers de-
jure 4 Legislature exists 34 
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Suffrage 5 Executive electoral regime 4 
Executive electoral 
regime 4 Electoral regime 3 Electoral regime 33 
Freedom of the 
press 5 Legislature exists 4 Suffrage 3 
Legislative electoral 
regime 3 
Legislative electoral 
regime 33 
Freedom of 
assembly 5 Suffrage 4 
Legislature 
investigates 
executive 
3 Judicial independence 3 
Freedom of the 
press 11 
Legislature exists 4 Judicial independence 4 
Freedom of the 
press 3 
Freedom of the 
press 3 
Freedom of 
assembly 11 
Electoral regime 4 Freedom of assembly 4 
Freedom of 
assembly 3 
Legislature 
investigates 
executive 
2 Executive electoral regime 9 
Legislative 
electoral regime 4 
Legislature 
investigates 
executive 
2 Judicial independence 1 Suffrage 1 
Attorney general, 
Prosecutor 9 
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East Asia 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
South-East Asia 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
South Asia 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
Caribbean 
Contingency 
conditions 
(max 127) 
High court 
independence 
Highest score 
not reached 
Judicial 
accountability 
Highest score 
not reached Executive oversight 
Highest score 
not reached Engaged society 
Highest score 
not reached 
Lower court 
independence 
Highest score 
not reached Executive oversight 
Highest score 
not reached EMB autonomy 61 Executive oversight 
Highest score 
not reached 
Executive oversight Highest score not reached Media censorship 70 
High court 
independence 60 
Freedom of 
expression 
Highest score 
not reached 
Ombudsman Highest score not reached 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
62 Lower court independence 58 Freedom of assembly 
Highest score 
not reached 
Freedom of  the 
press 
Highest score 
not reached CSO entry and exit 47 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
51 Programmatic party links 76 
Freedom of 
expression 
Highest score 
not reached 
Freedom of 
discussion 46 CSO entry and exit 48 Media censorship 71 
Freedom of 
assembly 
Highest score 
not reached Engaged society 45 Media censorship 43 
Judicial 
accountability 70 
Engaged society 77 EMB autonomy 44 Engaged society 43 EMB autonomy 57 
EMB autonomy 70 Critical media 40 Ombudsman 41 High court independence 51 
CSO entry and exit 68 CSO repression 39 Critical media 36 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
49 
CSO repression 66 Media wide range of views 35 
Media wide range of 
views 34 Critical media 47 
Media censorship 65 Legislature controls resources 29 
Freedom of 
discussion 34 CSO repression 47 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
65 Wide involvement in CSOs 25 CSO repression 33 Vote buying 47 
Freedom of 
discussion 64 
Opposition parties 
autonomy 23 
Wide involvement in 
CSOs 32 CSO entry and exit 46 
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Critical media 63 Party barriers de-facto 23 
Opposition parties 
autonomy 32 
Legislature controls 
resources 45 
Media wide range of 
views 62 Legislature exists 21 
Freedom of 
expression 32 
Wide involvement in 
CSOs 44 
Clean elections 61 Clean elections 20 Programmatic party links 30 
Lower court 
independence 44 
Programmatic party 
links 60 
Lower court 
independence 18 
Multi-party elections 
de-facto 28 
Attorney general, 
Prosecutor 40 
Party barriers de-
facto 57 
Executive electoral 
regime 17 
Legislature controls 
resources 27 Clean elections 38 
Wide involvement in 
CSOs 54 
High court 
independence 15 Clean elections 27 
Freedom of 
expression 36 
Opposition parties 
autonomy 51 
Programmatic party 
links 15 Party barriers de-facto 24 
Media wide range of 
views 35 
Legislature controls 
resources 41 Vote buying 15 Vote buying 22 
Multi-party elections 
de-facto 35 
Judicial 
accountability 40 Ombudsman 15 
Executive electoral 
regime 16 
Freedom of 
discussion 34 
Executive electoral 
regime 35 Party barriers de-jure 9 Judicial accountability 14 Ombudsman 31 
Legislature exists 33 Attorney general, Prosecutor 6 Party barriers de-jure 14 
Opposition parties 
autonomy 29 
Multi-party elections 
de-facto 33 Electoral regime 5 
Multi-party elections 
de-jure 13 Legislature exists 25 
Multi-party elections 
de-jure 27 
Legislative electoral 
regime 5 Legislature exists 12 
Party barriers de-
facto 24 
Party barriers de-jure 19 Multi-party elections de-facto 5 
Attorney general, 
Prosecutor 9 
Multi-party elections 
de-jure 19 
Vote buying 11 Judicial independence 5 Freedom of the press 9 Party barriers de-jure 17 
Attorney general, 
Prosecutor 10 
Freedom of 
expression 5 Freedom of assembly 9 Electoral regime 13 
Legislature 
investigates 
executive 
10 
Legislature 
investigates 
executive 
4 Suffrage 7 Legislative electoral regime 13 
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Judicial 
independence 9 
Freedom of the 
press 4 Electoral regime 7 Suffrage 12 
Suffrage 6 Freedom of assembly 4 
Legislative electoral 
regime 7 
Executive electoral 
regime 12 
Electoral regime 6 Suffrage 1 Judicial independence 6 Judicial independence 10 
Legislative electoral 
regime 6 
Multi-party elections 
de-jure 1 
Legislature 
investigates executive 5 
Legislature 
investigates executive 6 
 
  
Note: Indicators sorted in descending order: highest number of dependencies on top. Vertical accountability indicators are in red, horizontal in blue, diagonal in green. 
Indicators that are stricken out have not reached the highest level in a single country in the respective region by 2012.  
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Table A.3. Detailed contingency levels to reach the highest state on selected indicators. 
Legislature investigates in 
practice Level   High court independence Level   Executive oversight Level   CSO repression Level 
Opposition parties autonomy 4 
 
Opposition parties autonomy 4 
 
Opposition parties autonomy 4 
 
CSO entry and exit 3 
Election free and fair 4 
 
Election free and fair 4 
 
Election free and fair 4 
 
Opposition parties autonomy 3 
Media censorship 3 
 
Media censorship 3 
 
Media wide range of views 3 
 
Freedom of discussion 3 
Media wide range of views 3 
 
CSO repression 3 
 
CSO repression 3 
 
Media censorship 2 
CSO repression 3 
 
CSO entry and exit 3 
 
Engaged society 3 
 
Print or broadcast Critical 
media 2 
Engaged society 3 
 
Lower court independence 3 
 
CSO entry and exit 3 
 
Media wide range of views 2 
CSO entry and exit 3 
 
EMB autonomy 3 
 
Legislature investigates in 
practice 3 
 
Engaged society 2 
High court independence 3 
 
Election vote buying 3 
 
EMB autonomy 3 
 
Election free and fair 2 
Lower court independence 3 
 
De-facto Party barriers 3 
 
Programmatic party links 3 
 
De-facto Party barriers 2 
Executive oversight 3 
 
De-facto multi-party elections 3 
 
De-facto Party barriers 3 
 
De-facto multi-party elections 2 
EMB autonomy 3 
 
Freedom of discussion 3 
 
De-facto multi-party elections 3 
 
Legislature exists 1 
Programmatic party links 3 
 
Print or broadcast Critical media 2 
 
Freedom of discussion 3 
 
Electoral Regime Index 1 
De-facto Party barriers 3 
 
Media wide range of views 2 
 
Media censorship 2 
 
Legislative electoral regime 
index 1 
De-facto multi-party elections 3 
 
Wide involvement in CSOs 2 
 
Print or broadcast Critical media 2 
 
Wide involvement in CSOs 1 
Freedom of discussion 3 
 
Engaged society 2 
 
Wide involvement in CSOs 2 
 
Legislature investigates in 
practice 1 
Print or broadcast Critical media 2 
 
Legislature investigates in practice 2 
 
Election vote buying 2 
 
High court independence 1 
Wide involvement in CSOs 2 
 
Executive oversight 2 
 
Legislature exists 1 
 
Lower court independence 1 
Judicial accountability 2 
 
Legislature exists 1 
 
Electoral Regime Index 1 
 
Judicial accountability 1 
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Election vote buying 2  Electoral Regime Index 1  Legislative electoral regime index 1  Executive oversight 1 
Legislature exists 1  Legislative electoral regime index 1  Legislature controls resources 1  EMB autonomy 1 
Electoral Regime Index 1  Judicial accountability 1  High court independence 1  Programmatic party links 1 
Legislative electoral regime 
index 
1  Programmatic party links 1  Lower court independence 1  Election vote buying 1 
Legislature controls resources 1  De-jure Party barriers 1  Judicial accountability 1  De-jure Party barriers 1 
De-jure Party barriers 1  De-jure multi-party elections 1  De-jure Party barriers 1  De-jure multi-party elections 1 
De-jure multi-party elections 1  Executive electoral regime index 0  De-jure multi-party elections 1  Executive electoral regime 
index 
0 
Legislature investigates 
executive by law 
1  Legislature controls resources 0  Freedom of expression 1  Legislature controls resources 0 
Executive electoral regime index 0  Attorney general/Prosecutor 
general 
0  Share of population with suffrage 1  Attorney general/Prosecutor 
general 
0 
Attorney general/Prosecutor 
general 
0  Legislature investigates executive 
by law 
0  Executive electoral regime index 0  Legislature investigates 
executive by law 
0 
Judicial independence by law 0  Judicial independence by law 0  Attorney general/Prosecutor 
general 
0  Judicial independence by law 0 
Ombudsman 0  Ombudsman 0  Legislature investigates executive 
by law 
0  Ombudsman 0 
Freedom of expression 0  Freedom of expression 0  Judicial independence by law 0  Freedom of expression 0 
Freedom of the press 0  Freedom of the press 0  Ombudsman 0  Freedom of the press 0 
Freedom of assembly 0  Freedom of assembly 0  Freedom of the press 0  Freedom of assembly 0 
Share of population with 
suffrage 
0   Share of population with suffrage 0   Freedom of assembly 0   Share of population with 
suffrage 
0 
           
Contingency Conditions  62   54   57   37 
 
Note: Indicators sorted in descending order: highest number of contingency conditions on top. 
 
